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Some Three Person Games in Coalitional Form for Teaching and Experimentation

Martin Shubik

No 747, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Since 1973 I have used several three person games in coalitional form for both teaching and experimental purposes. They have been run in primarily a normative mode. The individuals have been asked to act as judges called upon to recommend a division of assets among three players. The basic use of these games has been to help to raise questions about context and solution concepts in cooperative game theory. Since 1980 the three basic games noted below have been used with five more or less similar groups of students at Yale. The games, their didactic purpose and the results from the normative suggestions as to how the players should be rewarded are noted here and then these results are compared with previous games. Furthermore, some extra sensitivity analysis problems are noted.

Keywords: Game theory; cooperative game solutions; sensitivity analysis problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985-05
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