On Finitely Repeated Games and Pseudo-Nash Equilibria

Chien fu Chou and John Geanakoplos (john.geanakoplos@yale.edu)
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John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/john-geanakoplos

No 777, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: In this paper we propose a pseudo-Nash equilibrium for N-person games in which very simply we allow play in the last period to be arbitrary, but otherwise it must conform to the (perfect) Nash optimality criterion.

Keywords: Pseudo-Nash equilibrium; arbitrary last period play; overlapping generations economies; Radner's definition; "crazy equilibrium" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1985-10
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