Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence

Martin Shubik

No 829, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.

Keywords: Game theory; nuclear deterrence; arms race; escalation; retaliation; threat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 97 pages
Date: 1987-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d08/d0829.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:829

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().