Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures

John Geanakoplos (), Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel
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John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/john-geanakoplos
Adam Brandenburger: Harvard Business School

No 884R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.

Keywords: Correlated equilibria; subjective priors; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1988, Revised 1989-08
Note: CFP 819.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1992), 4: 182-201

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Journal Article: Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures (1992)
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