The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

Martin Shubik

No 891, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.

Keywords: Experimental economics; game theory; experimental methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1988-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3, 2001

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