Voting by Committees
Salvador Barberà (salvador.barbera@uab.cat),
Hugo Sonnenschein and
Lin Zhou
No 941, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Abstract:
Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set K = (1,2,...,k) of objects. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of voting schemes called voting by committees. The main result of the paper is a characterization of voting by committees, which is the class of all voting schemes that satisfy voter sovereignty and non-manipulability on the domain of separable preferences. This result is analogous to the literature on the Groves and Clarke scheme in that it characterizes all of the non-manipulable voting schemes on an important domain.
Keywords: Social choice; voting; committees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1990-05
Note: CFP 783.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Published in Econometrica (May 1991), 59(3): 595-609
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