Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies

Lin Zhou

No 954, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2 times n (n >= 2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1990-09
Note: CFP 793.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (1991), 8: 247-254

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