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The Hybrid Solutions of an n-Person Game

Jingang Zhao

No 956, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We introduce a solution concept intermediate between the cooperative and noncooperative solutions of an n-person game in normal form. Consider a partition p of the players, with each s in p a coalition. A joint strategy x = {x_{s}|s in p} is a hybrid solution for the partition p if, for each s in p, x_{s} is a core solution of the corresponding parametric subgame, where this game is played by the players in s and is parameterized by x_{-s}, the strategies played by all outside players. This assumes that players behave cooperatively within each coalition and competitively across coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for a general n-person game to have hybrid solutions for any partition.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1990-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (January 1992), 4(1): 145-160

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