A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation

Lin Zhou

No 974, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce the refined bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that simultaneously provides answers to both of the fundamental questions.

Keywords: Cooperative games; game theory; bargaining coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1991-04
Note: CFP 868.
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1994), 6: 512-526

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