A Bound of the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games

Faruk Gul, David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
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David G. Pearce: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://cowles.yale.edu/
Ennio Stacchetti: Dept. of Economics, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/

No 981, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: In a generic finite normal form game with 2(alpha) + 1 Nash equilibria, at least alpha of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria (that is, they involve randomization by some players).

Keywords: Normal form; mixed strategy; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1991-05
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Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (August 1993), 18(3): 548-552

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