Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Carsten Helm and Michael Neugart

Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) from Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL)

Abstract: With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics . 192 (2009)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2024)
Journal Article: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Coalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:wpaper:77399

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