Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem

Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Schwartz

Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) from Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL)

Date: 2014
Note: for complete metadata visit http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/86031/
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2014) : pp. 116-126

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem (2014)
Working Paper: Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem (2013)
Working Paper: Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:wpaper:86031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) from Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dekanatssekretariat ().