Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game

Ismael Rodriguez-Lara and Pablo Brañas-Garza

No 412, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES

Abstract: This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner.

Keywords: expectations; strategic sophistication; dictator game; equal; split; guessing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2012/0412.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: What do we expect of others? (2014)
Working Paper: Expected Behavior in the Dictator Game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0412

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