What do we expect of others?

Pablo Brañas-Garza and Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We report experimental data on expectations about generosity in a dictator game in which dictators first divide the pie and then make a guess about the donation of other dictators. In our experiment, recipients have to guess the donation that they are going to receive from their own dictator as well as the donation of other dictator, whose choice does not affect their own payoffs. Our findings indicate that property rights are important to explain guesses, as dictators predict a smaller donation from other dictators than recipients do. We also observe that the involvement in the game is crucial as recipients expect other dictators to be more generous than their own dictator. When we compare guesses with actual donations, we see that dictators' guesses are positively correlated with their own transfer and that recipients overestimate the kindness of other dictators, as they expect them to be more kind than what they actually are.

Keywords: generosity; expectations; dictator game; fairness; property rights; involvement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53760/11/MPRA_paper_53760.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60046/1/MPRA_paper_60046.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/73744/1/MPRA_paper_60046.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/73745/1/MPRA_paper_73745.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75587/8/MPRA_paper_75587.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game (2012)
Working Paper: Expected Behavior in the Dictator Game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:53760

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