The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth

David Martimort and Thierry Verdier

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: This paper proposes an analysis of the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face agency costs. These agency costs are due to the existence of asymmetries of information and the formation of internal vertical collusions. As a response to the opportunity of internal collusion, optimal incentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive side contracting within organizations. This un turn affects the firms profitability and the return to innovation and the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy. We then discuss the relationships between the structure of internal transaction costs, organizational technologies and macroeconomic growth.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Growth, 2000, 5, pp, 315-340.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth (2000)
Working Paper: The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:1999-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).