The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth

David Martimort and Thierry Verdier

Working Papers from Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie

Abstract: This paper proposes an analysis of the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face agency costs. These agency costs are due to the existence of asymmetries of information and the formation of internal vertical collusions. As a response to the opportunity of internal collusion optimal incentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive side contracting within organizations.

Keywords: ECONOMIC GROWTH; COSTS; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L14 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1999
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Journal Article: The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth (2000)
Working Paper: The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavale:1999-08

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