Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment

Maurice Kugler (), Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity relative to legal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely intensification of policing and increment of sanctions, and crime is nonmonotonic. Beyond a threshold, increases in expected punishment induce organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads to higher rather than lower crime.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Journal Article: Organized crime, corruption and punishment (2005)
Working Paper: Organized crime, corruption and punishment (2005)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment (2003)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-34

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