Organized crime, corruption and punishment

Maurice Kugler (), Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou

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Abstract: We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime.

Keywords: Deterrence; Organized crime; Corruption; Oligopoly; Free entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89 (9-10), pp.1639-1663. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Organized crime, corruption and punishment (2005)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment (2003)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment (2003)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754068

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005

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