Social Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up
Jana Friedrichsen (),
Tobias König and
Renke Schmacker ()
No 1752, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live o_ others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of \taxpayers" vote for the public transfer.
Keywords: Stigma; signaling; redistribution; non take-up; welfare program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H31 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Social image concerns and welfare take-up (2018)
Working Paper: Social Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up (2018)
Working Paper: Social image concerns and welfare take-up (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1752
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