Cheating and Corruption: Evidence from a Household Survey
Lukas Menkhoff and
No 1826, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
This study tests the prediction that a corrupt government reduces ethical behavior among its citizens. We integrate a standard "cheating" experiment into a broad household survey and find clear support for this prediction: respondents who perceive corruption in state affairs are more likely to cheat. Interestingly, there is a small group of non-conformers. The main relation is robust to consideration of many (largely insignificant) socio-demographic control variables. Attendance of others at the cheating experiment, thus stimulating the reputational concern to be seen as honest, reduces cheating. Again, this does not diminish the predictive role of corruption.
Keywords: Cheating; Corruption; Individual Characteristics; Lab-in-the-Field Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 D81 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 p.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1826
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