EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cheating and Corruption: Evidence from a Household Survey

Olaf Hübler, Melanie Koch, Lukas Menkhoff and Ulrich Schmidt

No 1826, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This study tests the prediction that a corrupt government reduces ethical behavior among its citizens. We integrate a standard "cheating" experiment into a broad household survey and find clear support for this prediction: respondents who perceive corruption in state affairs are more likely to cheat. Interestingly, there is a small group of non-conformers. The main relation is robust to consideration of many (largely insignificant) socio-demographic control variables. Attendance of others at the cheating experiment, thus stimulating the reputational concern to be seen as honest, reduces cheating. Again, this does not diminish the predictive role of corruption.

Keywords: Cheating; Corruption; Individual Characteristics; Lab-in-the-Field Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 D81 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 p.
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.684642.de/dp1826.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1826

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bibliothek ().

 
Page updated 2020-05-25
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1826