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Preferences for Childcare Policies: Theory and Evidence

Rainald Borck () and Katharina Wrohlich

No 827, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: We analyse preferences for public, private or mixed provision of childcare theoretically and empirically. We model childcare as a publicly provided private good. Richer households should prefer private provision to either pure public or mixed provision. If public provision redistributes from rich to poor, they should favour mixed over pure public provision, but if public provision redistributes from poor to rich, the rich and poor might favour mixed provision while the middle class favour public provision ('ends against the middle'). Using estimates for household preferences from survey data, we find no support for the ends-against-the-middle result.

Keywords: childcare; redistribution; political preferences; public provision of private goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J13 D72 H42 D19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: Preferences for childcare policies: Theory and evidence (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Preferences for Childcare Policies: Theory and Evidence (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Preferences for Childcare Policies: Theory and Evidence (2008) Downloads
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