A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents

Shuhei Morimoto, Shigehiro Serizawa and Stephen Ching

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.

Date: 2010-02
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Journal Article: A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0769

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