A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

Shuhei Morimoto (), Shigehiro Serizawa and Stephen Ching ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 3, 911 pages

Abstract: We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9

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