All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Minoru Kitahara () and Ryo Ogawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: An all-pay auction in which the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and the handicap, the latter of which is endowed to the players, is analyzed. The bidding strategy in an equilibrium is explicitly derived as a "piecewise affine transformation" of the equilibrium strategy in the all-pay auction without handicaps. Allocation rule implemented in the equilibrium and revenue comparison are also discussed.

Date: 2010-03, Revised 2010-06
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