Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
Tomoya Kazumura and
Shigehiro Serizawa ()
ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects. This paper is to investigate the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules in such environments. A preference relation is single demand if an agent wishes to receive at most one object; it is multi demand if whenever an agent receives one object, an additional object makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains all the single demand preferences and at least one multi demand preference relation, and there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.
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Journal Article: Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0943
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