Details about Tomoya Kazumura

Access statistics for papers by Tomoya Kazumura.

Last updated 2022-07-26. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pka1553

Working Papers

2022

1. Multi-unit Object Allocation Problems with Money for (Non)Decreasing Incremental Valuations: Impossibility and Characterization Theorems
   ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University View citations (2)

2020

2. Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
   ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University View citations (13)
   See also Journal Article Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2020) View citations (9) (2020)

2017

3. Mechanism design without quasilinearity
   Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi View citations (7)
   Also in ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University (2017) View citations (10)
   See also Journal Article Mechanism design without quasilinearity, Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society (2020) View citations (3) (2020)
4. Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
   Working Papers, Tokyo Center for Economic Research View citations (2)
5. Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
   Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi View citations (2)

2016

6. Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects
   ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

2015

7. Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
   ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2016) View citations (17) (2016)

Journal Articles

2020

1. Mechanism design without quasilinearity
   Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, (2) View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Mechanism design without quasilinearity, Discussion Papers (2017) View citations (7) (2017)
2. Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 188, (C) View citations (9)
   See also Working Paper Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences, ISER Discussion Paper (2020) View citations (13) (2020)

2019

3. Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, 48, (2), 543-569

2016

4. Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 47, (3), 633-663 View citations (17)
   See also Working Paper Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences, ISER Discussion Paper (2015) View citations (2) (2015)