Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Tomoya Kazumura (), Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for the quasilinear domain, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear domains, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain domains with positive income effect.

Date: 2017-05, Revised 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Journal Article: Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (2020)
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