On Strategy-proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives

Abhinaba Lahiri and Anup Pramanik ()

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterizes the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Our main result provides a simple characterization of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. Our analysis can help policy makers choose among these rules.

Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1013

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