On Strategy-proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives
Abhinaba Lahiri and
Anup Pramanik ()
ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterizes the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Our main result provides a simple characterization of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. Our analysis can help policy makers choose among these rules.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1013
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().