On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives

Abhinaba Lahiri () and Anup Pramanik ()
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Abhinaba Lahiri: Indian Institute of Science Education and Research

Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 54, issue 4, No 4, 607 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterize the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Further, we provide a simple description of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. The key feature of our characterization results brings out the role played by indifferent agents.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01220-7

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