An Experiment on The Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Abstract: We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter’s demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.

Date: 2022-05, Revised 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2022/DP1175R.pdf

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Journal Article: An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value (2023)
Working Paper: An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value (2023)
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