An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada
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Takashi Yamada: Yamaguchi University [Yamaguchi]

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Abstract: We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.

Keywords: Nash program; Bargaining procedures; Shapley value; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 141, pp.88-104. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010⟩

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Journal Article: An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value (2023)
Working Paper: An Experiment on The Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value (2023)
Working Paper: An Experiment on the Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04194465

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010

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