Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies

Shuhei Kitamura, Ryo Takahashi and Katsunori Yamada

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: Elections are a primary mechanism through which citizens can hold politicians accountable for misconduct. However, whether voters actually punish corruption at the ballot box remains an open question, as electoral decisions often involve strategic considerations, including beliefs about how others think and behave. To better understand how such strategic considerations operate in this context, we conducted a pre-registered information intervention during a major political corruption scandal in Japan. The treatment provided information about the prevailing social norm—specifically, the perceived social intolerance of the scandal. The treatment increased turnout and support for a challenger, particularly among swing voters who initially believed that others were intolerant of corruption. Among party loyalists with more lenient prior beliefs, the same information backfired, increasing support for the incumbent. The turnout effect among swing voters was sizable—approximately six percentage points—comparable in magnitude to benchmark mobilization interventions involving personalized contact or social pressure. To account for these patterns, we develop a simple model that incorporates mechanisms—notably moral reinforcement and identity reinforcement—that generate predictions consistent with the observed heterogeneity in responses. By highlighting how perceptions of prevailing norms shape voter behavior in the presence of strategic considerations, this study contributes to a broader understanding of how democratic institutions can remain resilient in the face of political misconduct.

Date: 2025-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1289.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1289

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().