The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I

Vincent Bignon and Marc Flandreau

No 2010-18, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-1914 French capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals sought to secure property rights over issuers’ reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new evidence from contemporary sources.

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France Before World War I (2011)
Working Paper: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I (2010)
Working Paper: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2010-18

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