The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I

Vincent Bignon and Marc Flandreau ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This article analyzes the economics of "badmouthing" in the context of the pre-1914 French capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals sought to secure property rights over issuers' reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new evidence from contemporary sources.

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Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04140910
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France Before World War I (2011)
Working Paper: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I (2010)
Working Paper: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I (2010)
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