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Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Eric Langlais (), Bruno Lovat and Francesco Parisi ()

No 2013-5, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players’ efforts, on probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking.

Keywords: rent-seeking games; returns to effort; asymmetric rents; asymmetric strength; tradable rents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2013
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