Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Eric Langlais, Bruno Lovat and Francesco Parisi

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Abstract: In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock's rentseeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players' efforts, on probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking.

Keywords: rent-seeking games; returns to effort; asymmetric rents; asymmetric strength; tradable rents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04141218
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Working Paper: Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking (2013)
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