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Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais () and Lars Sørgard ()

No 2014-29, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. For this we study how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers, and determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency. We find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. The resulting welfare from merger control can indeed be lower than without remedies.

Keywords: merger control; merger remedies; enforcement; deterrence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2014/WP_EcoX_2014-29.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2018)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2013)
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