Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Lars Sørgard

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Date: 2018
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Published in Review of Law and Economics, 2018, 14

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Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2013)
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