Economics at your fingertips  

Existence and Optimality of Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Bilateral Oligopoly with Atoms and an Atomless Part

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien and Simone Tonin

No 2018-10, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (1973), that a Cournot-Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.

Keywords: Shapley window model; Atoms; Atomless part; Cournot–Nash equilibrium; Optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Valerie Mignon ().

Page updated 2020-02-19
Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2018-10