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Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato (giulio.codognato@uniud.it), Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien (ludovic.julien@parisnanterre.fr) and Simone Tonin
Additional contact information
Francesca Busetto: Università degli Studi di Udine - University of Udine [Italie]
Giulio Codognato: Università degli Studi di Udine - University of Udine [Italie], EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Simone Tonin: Università degli Studi di Udine - University of Udine [Italie]

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Abstract: We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467-501, 1973), that a Cournot-Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, 49 (4), pp.933-951. ⟨10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Existence and Optimality of Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Bilateral Oligopoly with Atoms and an Atomless Part (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Existence and Optimality of Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Bilateral Oligopoly with Atoms and an Atomless Part (2018) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02531404

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z

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