On the Endogeneity and Robustness of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria: Games of Accumulation

Richard Romano and Huseyin Yildirim

No 01-06, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution games to public goods, oligopoly games, and rent-seeking games.

JEL-codes: C72 D43 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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