William Kaempfer (),
Edward Tower () and
Thomas D. Willett
No 02-20, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics
This paper is a short, non-technical exposition of the political economy of protection. It asks how do political forces operate to generate protection, and what determines the magnitude and form that protection takes.
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Forthcoming in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE, edited by Charles K. Rowley.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:duk:dukeec:02-20
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