School Choice: Money, Race And Congressional Voting Behavior

Joshua J. Phillips, Omer Gokcekus and Edward Tower

No 02-27, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper discovers that a campaign contribution to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives by the National Education Association (the major teacher's union) in the 2000 election cycle reduces the probability that a Representative will vote for a pro-choice amendment to the "No Child Left Behind Act of 2001." It also discovers that a Representative who represents a district with a large African American population or who is Republican is more likely to vote for vouchers. Finally, it notes that subsequent NEA contributions reward anti-voucher representatives and punish pro-voucher Representatives.

JEL-codes: I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:duk:dukeec:02-27

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