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Seeking Lobbying Rents

Gregory Besharov

No 02-34, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Combining rent-seeking and menu auction models allows the study of efficiency in a political economy where lobbying creates rents that politicians expend resources to obtain. Policy choices, lobbying, and rent-seeking are determined endogenously. When all interests lobby, equilibrium local public good provision and rents do not depend on who achieves office. Having only a fixed cost of rent-seeking replicates citizen candidate results. Generalizing the model, so additional expenditures have effect, reduces entrants and rent-seeking costs. Even when entry would suggest full rent dissipation, the small number of entrants to political contests gives rise to less.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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