Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy: An Economic Analysis of the Attack on Gun Control

Phillip J. Cook and James A. Leitzel

No 95-44, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: "Gun control" measures include a wide spectrum of laws regulating the manufacture, import, sale, possession, and use of guns, with the ultimate purpose of reducing gun violence. As we would expect from Albert Hirschman's 1991 book on this subject, oppone nts of such laws argue that they tend to be futile (no effect), or perverse (the results are opposite to that intended), while causing jeopardy to fundamental values and rights. Opponents also argue that gun controls are a distraction from mustering the more effective and appropriate response to gun violence, which (they say) is severe punishment administered with high probability. In this article we argue that a preemptive approach to gun violence can be justified given the practical and ethical limits to punishing crime ex post. We then consider the "futility" and "perversity" arguments, to the effect that a large proportion of gun transactions, particularly those involving felons and youths, are beyond the reach of our regulatory apparatus. To the extent that the formal and informal markets are linked, we demonstrate that the effect and force of regulations may pass through to the unregulated sector; an obvious example is a tax on the sale of new guns. Finally, we analyze the "jeopardy" argument, suggesting that whatever "right" there may be or should be to keep private firearms, it is not absolute.

Date: 1995
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Published in LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 59, 1996, pages 91-118

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