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Discrimination by Microcredit Officers:Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda

Pierre-Guillaume Méon (), Roy Mersland (), Ariane Szafarz and Marc Labie ()

No 11-06, DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between a microfinance institution (MFI) and its credit officers when the latter discriminate against a group of the target population. Using survey data from Uganda, we provide evidence that credit officers are more biased against disabled borrowers than other employees. In line with the evidence, we then build an agency model of a non-profit MFI and a discriminating credit officer. Since incentive schemes are costly and the MFI’s budget is limited, even a non-discriminating welfare-maximizing MFI may prefer paying smaller incentivizing compensation, and letting its credit officer discriminate to some extent.

Keywords: Microfinance; Discrimination; Credit Officers; Incentives; Disability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 J33 L30 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 p.
Date: 2011-05-18
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

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https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/8719 ... Officers_May2011.pdf 11-06Discrimination_by_Microcredit_Officers_May 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Discrimination by Microcredit Officers: Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda (2015)
Working Paper: Discrimination by Microcredit Officers: Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda (2010) Downloads
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