The Value of Strategic Unpredictability: A Natural Experiment from Baseball

Aleksei Chernulich, Romain Gauriot and John Wooders

No 2026_09, Department of Economics Working Papers from Durham University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Strategic situations in which decision-makers need to be unpredictable are com mon. This paper introduces a measure of the value of strategic unpredictability for a player and shows that it determines (i) the player’s incentive to follow equilib rium and (ii) the power of statistical tests of whether the player’s opponent follows their equilibrium mixture. We use data from a unique natural experiment in Major League Baseball to estimate the value of strategic unpredictability for pitchers. We find that the Houston Astros gained a significant advantage by stealing opposing teams’ signs, thereby reducing opposing pitchers’ ability to be unpredictable.

Date: 2026-07
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