Manager Unethical Behavior During The New Economy Bubble

Radu Vranceanu

No DR 03026, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper investigates factors that brought about the surge in manager unethical behavior within the US economy. Key structural causes are the weak internal control, perverse incentives related to managers’ compensation, conflicts of interest in the banking and auditing sectors. Unethical behavior was further enhanced by the large economic noise specific to the IT bubble, which emerged in the late nineties against the background of increased deregulation in the goods and financial markets. The US administration opposed to the proliferation of CEO unethical behavior the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; we argue why some of its provisions might be taken one step further

Keywords: Unethical behavior; CEOs; Financial deregulation; Activism; Sarbanes-Oxely Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 K22 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-law and nep-reg
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