Cartels globaux, riposte américaine. L’ère Empagran ?

Med Rezzouk

No DR 04013, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper discusses the possible significance of the recent Empagran decision of the US Supreme court for the extraterritorial enforcement of competition law. In this decision the US Supreme rejected the claim of foreign plaintiff suing in the US another foreign firm which had participated in an international cartel but the Court did not rule out that such a claim could be admitted if it was established that the damage abroad was linked to a domestic violation of the Sherman act. We focus on two questions: - Is the Empagran decision merely a reaffirmation of a strict interpretation of the effects doctrine, and , if that is the case, how can the enforcement of domestic competition laws by national competition authorities deal with transnational anticompetitive practices ? - Can the Empagran decision be understood as signalling a move a move away from the pure effects doctrine and the beginning of a new era with a reinforced role for US courts in the fight against international cartels ?

Keywords: Trade; Antitrust; Comity; International Cartels; Extraterritoriality; Developing Countries; Economic History (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H73 K21 K33 L41 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2004-12
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Journal Article: Cartels globaux, riposte américaine. L'ère empagran ? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-04013

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