Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale

Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

No DR 06003, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: The paper develops a simple model of the market for academic publications in business and economics. The supply of papers is presented as the outcome of a game between researchers and schools’ deans under imperfect information about the quality of a given paper. The demand for papers brings into the picture the editorial selection process. After defining the equilibrium of this market, the model allows us to study the consequences of more powerful incentives for publication in major journals. It turns out that too large bonuses, as implemented by business schools in the recent years, might bring about several unpleasant consequences, as a drop in the quality of major journals, a decline in the number of top-tier publications realized by leading research institutions and a fall in the expected compensation of top researchers.

Keywords: Academic Journals; Business Schools; Incentives for Publishing; Publications Market; Rankings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 D89 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2006-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools' tale (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-06003

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